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Abstract In Uganda, environmental and natural resource
management is decentralized and has been the responsi-
bility of local districts since 1996. This environmental
management arrangement was part of a broader decen-
tralization process and was intended to increase local
ownership and improve environmental policy; however, its
implementation has encountered several major challenges
over the last decade. This article reviews some of the key
structural problems facing decentralized environmental
policy in this central African country and examines these
issues within the wider framework of political decentral-
ization. Tensions have arisen between technical staff and
politicians, between various levels of governance, and
between environmental and other policy domains. This
review offers a critical reflection on the perspectives and
limitations of decentralized environmental governance in
Uganda. Our conclusions focus on the need to balance
administrative staff and local politicians, the mainstream-
ing of local environmental policy, and the role of interna-
tional donors.
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The decentralization of environmental and natural resource
management is often cited as a simple and attractive way to
improve environmental policy. This view is based on the
idea that most governments, particularly African govern-
ments, do not have the capacity at the central level to
effectively implement necessary environmental protection
measures. This impediment leads to a continued degrada-
tion of soil, forest coverage, water quality, and biodiversity
(UNEP 2002). Environmental management is thought to be
more effective when local communities are given respon-
sibility; these communities are supposedly better placed to
manage their neighboring environment and natural
resources.
Since the early 1990s, many countries have promoted
decentralized environmental governance as part of a
broader trend toward the decentralization of governmental
responsibilities; this decentralization is designed to
improve effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and
democracy. Uganda has been hailed as a positive example
in Africa because of its radical shifting of responsibilities
to the local (district) level, including considerable human
and financial resources. The decentralization of environ-
mental and natural resource management has become a
substantial and integral part of this policy. But has this led
to real improvements?
Studies of decentralized environmental governance
suggest that different programs in Africa have failed to
effectively deliver on their promises both to the community
and to the environment (Blaikie 2006; Conyers 2007;
Robinson 2007; Polidano and Hulme 1999). These disap-
pointing results are at least partly attributed to the diffi-
culties of improving environmental performance under the
conditions of structural poverty and in situations where the
local community is highly dependent on natural resources.
However, other researchers point to the complex relation-
ships among public administrators, political elites, and
international donors who are involved in national and local
politics (Andeweg 2006; Blaikie 2006; Mubeezi 2007). An
examination of the extensive experience of decentralized
environmental governance in Uganda may offer useful
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insights into the relevance of these explanations and help
governments understand whether such difficulties can be
overcome. Therefore, this article closely examines the
recent political history of Uganda and asks to what extent
this country has been able to improve its environmental and
natural resource management through decentralization. The
article draws on several sources: existing literature; two
qualitative case studies completed by M.Sc. students that
examine decentralized wetland management and environ-
mental health policies in different districts of Uganda; three
training workshops for District Environmental Officers
(DEOs) in Uganda that were organized between 2005 and
2008; and several site visits to various regions of Uganda
(Kampala, Mukono, Jinja, and Masaka).
We begin by taking a closer look at the broader debate
on decentralization and environmental policy and then
provide an overview of recent developments in Uganda.
Next, we assess current practices in local environmental
governance in Uganda. Finally, we conclude by discussing
the limitations and perspectives of local environmental
governance; we intend to identify the conditions under
which local environmental and natural resource manage-
ment can live up to the challenge of securing Uganda’s rich
resources for future generations.
Decentralization and Environmental Policy
Political decentralization became popular in the 1980s and
continued to gain the support of many African govern-
ments in the 1990s. Despite its popularity, the precise
definition of decentralization and the best model for its
implementation remain unclear. Several concepts (decon-
centration, delegation, and devolution [Dressler 2006])
have been used to describe the various approaches imple-
mented in different countries, to explain their respective
successes and failures, and to identify the most promising
model. Because of the different conceptual frameworks
applied, this debate has not produced a shared ideal model
of decentralization.
For many scholars, decentralization should implement
the objectives of the New Public Management School; this
view focuses on a technocratic model intended to create
more effective and efficient public service delivery (Kiragu
2002; Conyers 2007). Increased orientation toward clients in
the operation of such services is sought through the ‘‘un-
bundling of vertically integrated bureaucracies into separate
organizational or ownership forms with the aim of
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public goods
and services’’ (Caulfield 2006, p. 17). The underlying
assumption here is that specialized service delivery systems
can function more effectively when they are not under the
direct political control of a government ministry. Most
African governments were considered weak and unable to
deliver the goods and services demanded by the different
groups in society. The devolvement of administrative
capacity and active involvement of stakeholders was
therefore expected to address this weakness. These policy
reforms were broadly supported by international donors who
expected them to facilitate community participation and
strengthen the demand side of the public service equation.
However, decentralization is not just a technocratic and
administrative effort, but a political one as well. Some
consider decentralization to be a process of democratiza-
tion that redistributes power. In this view, decentralization
gives stakeholders a greater role in decision-making, and
this increased participation leads to better decisions which
are more broadly supported. However, others analyze this
as a dynamic political process in which centralization and
decentralization are interactively constituted. The process
does not simply involve ‘‘the distribution of the manifest
powers of decision-making and the challenges involved in
the (re)allocation of resources’’ (Berkhout 2005, p. 315),
because power is relational and mediated through dis-
courses (Foucault 1977). When analyzing processes of
decentralization it is therefore essential to distinguish
between the model and the outcome. The results of polit-
ical decentralization are not necessarily determined by the
selected model but, rather, by the interactions among the
model, the implementation process, and the specific local
and national dynamics through which decentralization is
effected. These dynamics take place at three levels: the
individual level, the institutional level, and the systemic
level. At the individual level, local capacity is influenced
by the values, culture, training, and attitudes of local
government personnel, both elected officials and adminis-
trative staff. At the institutional level, the impact relates to
local government structures, procedures, and operating
rules, all of which frame and govern the activities of per-
sonnel. At the systemic level, local governance is affected
by the policy and legal frameworks within which the local
governments operate and by the rules and practices that
govern the relations of local governmental authorities with
other actors (Romeo 2003). These different dynamics
exclude a simple focus on models of decentralization and
require a more detailed analysis of impacts in practice.
These general conclusions on the dynamics of decentral-
ization are relevant for the case of environmental and
natural resource management as well.
Although it is not necessarily the main reason for
engaging in a process of decentralization, environmental
and natural resource management seems to be an attractive
domain for it. The decentralization of natural resource
management in Africa is located at the intersection among
good governance and democracy, development and poverty
alleviation, and community-based resource management
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and local resource rights. Many environmentalists consider
the local community to be the most appropriate custodian
of environmental management since they ‘‘are better able
to understand and intervene in environmental problems
because they are ‘closer’ to both the problem and the
solution’’ (Lane and McDonald 2005, p. 710), although this
is also contested. These environmentalists define commu-
nities according to tight spatial boundaries of jurisdiction
and responsibilities and see them as having distinct and
integrated social structures and common interests. Hence, it
is expected that the local ownership of natural resources as
well as the administrative power to protect those resources
will be more effective than traditional, centralized envi-
ronmental policy. This focus on shared interest is expressed
in the widespread engagement of communities in the
implementation of Local Agenda 21 (Mehta 1996). In
Africa, as UNEP (2002) claims, natural resources have
been woven into the daily lives of many people. Particular
traditional and cultural values among the diverse commu-
nities across the continent have guided the way people
interact with their environment and how natural resources
are used and managed. In many subregions, the people’s
relationship with natural resources remains strong, and
traditional regulatory mechanisms are still in place that
facilitate sensible resource use and conservation. Envi-
ronmentalists often draw attention to these traditions to
promote decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa (Wood-
house 1997). Decentralized environmental and natural
resource management would allow local communities to be
actively involved and to address their main environmental
problems in ways that suit their local needs (Agrawal and
Gibson 1999). Some observers regard the decentralization
of environmental policy as even an ‘‘institutionalized form
of community participation’’ (Ribot 2002).
Others, however, question this idealistic image of local
communities. Larson and Soto (2008), for example, com-
ment that the concept of community often assumes ‘‘a
small and stable spatial unit, homogenous social structure,
and shared norms’’ (228), while reality is often much more
complex. Populations may be highly mobile, socially and
economically differentiated and possess competing inter-
ests and values. The decentralization of environmental and
natural resource management is therefore not only an
administrative act, but also a political process involving a
redistribution of power and resources (Larson and Soto
2008). However, when African governments initiate a
process of decentralization in natural resource manage-
ment, they tend to include the local level in such a way as
to render it manageable in a uniform manner. This effec-
tively requires local diversity to be ‘‘black-boxed’’ to make
it possible to regulate what is a diverse and complex
movement of people (and sometimes resources) through
space and time (Blaikie 2006). As a consequence, despite
the uniform approach used in the decentralization of
environmental policy, in reality the outcomes may differ
considerably between different local contexts. The results
are therefore moderated by national political histories and
cultures, by the specific dynamics involved in the interac-
tion between national and local level politics, and by
divisions of social class, ethnicity, and gender. As a result,
both the extent of decentralization and its outcomes will
vary from one context to another and from one natural
resource to another (Bazaara 2003).
Undertaking such a radical public sector reform as the
decentralization of environmental policy under the difficult
circumstances prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa is compli-
cated. State institutions dispose of limited financial and
human resources, while slow (or even negative) economic
growth and a high dependence on foreign aid complicate
the context even further. These constraints are probably
more pronounced at lower levels of government. We must
therefore analyze the strengths and weaknesses of decen-
tralized environmental governance; this article does so by
assessing the experiences of Uganda, with a focus on the
institutional and systemic levels.
Larson and Soto (2008) identified institutional configu-
rations and balances of power that emerge in two key
spheres during the decentralization process; they focused
on interactions between central and local authorities and
among local governments and other local actors involved
in or affected by natural resource management. In our case
study in Uganda, we distinguish between two interactions
in the second configuration: the interactions between the
local administrative staff and local politicians and those
between local environmental and natural resource man-
agement and other local policy domains.
Three specific tensions are particularly important in
decentralized environmental policymaking in Uganda and
are addressed in the remainder of this article.
1. The tension between technical staff and locally elected
officials who legitimately claim they represent their
constituents. These constituents do not always support
the introduction and implementation of environmental
protection measures (Caulfield 2006).
2. The tension between different levels of government,
particularly between the district level and the national level.
3. The tension between environmental and natural resource
management and other policy domains such as health,
education, agriculture, and economic development.
Environmental considerations must become a part of
mainstream local policies and must compete for limited
financial resources.
Before addressing these tensions, we offer a brief
introduction to the decentralization of environmental pol-
icy in Uganda.
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The History of Environmental Policy
Decentralization in Uganda
In the 1980s, Uganda initiated efforts to strengthen local
governments; the decentralization of natural resource
management was included in a later stage of this process.
Local governments were established in Uganda in the
colonial era but the political system became more cen-
tralized after 1967. Between the early 1970s and the middle
of the 1980s, Uganda went through a period of political
turmoil that led to a dramatic decline in its political and
economic performance. By the time the National Resis-
tance Movement took state power in 1986, this process was
reversed and national development, including the
strengthening of local governments, was taken up more
seriously. The main reforms were implemented in the
1980s and 1990s and were consolidated in a new consti-
tution in 1995; these reforms were further detailed in the
Local Governments Act of 1997. The decentralization
process continues to this day through both large and small
legal and administrative adaptations (Kisembo 2006).
Uganda’s policy of decentralization is officially focused
on empowering local populations via democratization,
participation, accountability, responsibility, efficiency, and
effectiveness (Nsibambi 1998). Institutionally, decentral-
ization in Uganda is built on a hierarchical structure of
local councils (LCs) that stretches from the village (LC1)
through the parish (LC2), the subcounty (LC3), the county
(LC4), and the district (LC5). These LCs have all been
empowered through decentralization but the process has
particularly affected the district and the sub-county levels;
these levels are considered to be a part of local govern-
ment, while the other levels are simply administrative
units. The main political and administrative powers at the
local level are vested in the district (LC5) and the gov-
erning body of the district is also directly elected by the
population. The number of districts in Uganda has grown
considerably over the years. From only 33 districts in 1986,
the number grew to 45 in 1998, 56 in 2003, and to 80 by
2008. This growth has improved manageability, although
with approximately 30 million inhabitants in Uganda, each
district still includes approximately 360,000 inhabitants.
On the other hand, this growing number of districts
necessitated continuous administrative reorganization at
the local level; this meant that more financial resources
were spent on administrative tasks and development bud-
gets thinned. In 2008, ‘‘75 of the 80 districts appealed for
financial assistance from the central government after
many had failed to meet their running costs’’ (The Inde-
pendent magazine, Sept 5–Sept 11, 2008, p. 16).
The continuous growth in the number of districts can be
explained by the social, cultural, economic, and political
dynamics generated at the local level by decentralization.
For example, ethnic sentiments suppressed under the
nation-building programs of the 1960s have resurfaced, so
districts with more than one ethnic group tend to break up
as political elites try to maximize benefits and minimize
losses to their political power and wealth. In addition,
political leaders from the ruling National Resistance
Movement seeking to build their numerical strength before
general elections encourage new districts in exchange for
political support.
In the early phase of decentralization, local authorities
could use the graduated tax they collected; in the 1999–
2000 fiscal year, this tax contributed to 67% of the locally
generated revenues (Iversen and others 2006). However,
over the years these incomes declined, and during the
presidential election of July 2005, the graduated tax was
completely abolished by national politicians. This move
stripped local authorities of their main local source of
income. In effect, this decision was a major step back in the
decentralization process. Although this has partly been
repaired by a (temporary) Graduated Tax Compensation
that allocates funds from the central government to local
governments (Republic of Uganda 2008), local authorities
now only control minor sources of self-generated revenue,
including the fees and taxes that are levied, charged, col-
lected, and appropriated as rents, rates, royalties, stamp
duties, or fees on registration and licensing. These limited
local financial resources and the restrictions attached to
funding received from the central government limit the
possible actions of decentralized governments.
Decentralizing Natural Resource Management
When the local governments were initially formalized in
1993, decentralization was seen not as a means of
democratizing power over natural resource management
but as a means of increasing revenue, promoting local
development, and improving the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of the state. Decentralization was initiated by the
National Resistance Movement leadership but pressure
from international donors further accelerated the process.
National authorities yielded to this pressure because they
needed international recognition and financial support
(Wetaaka Wadala 2007). It was only later that environ-
mental issues entered this realm, again mainly due to
pressure from foreign donors, including the World Bank.
These international donors made decentralization a condi-
tion for the release of grants or loans to implement certain
environment-related programs (Bazaara 2003). These
donors justified their interference with the claim that ‘‘user-
based natural resource management is the most reliable,
cost-effective, and sustainable method for as long as the
population is adequately educated and made aware of the
importance and potential wealth of natural resources’’
Environmental Management (2010) 45:284–295 287
123
(Odwedo 1995, p. 2). This approach was designed to shift
responsibility for natural resource management away from
the central government so that local authorities and com-
munities would not only be seen as conduits for the
implementation of national regulations. Decentralization
thus not only shifted the responsibility for environmental
planning and management to the districts but also was
intended to ensure the presence of participatory planning
and decision-making, transparency, accountability, and
sustainability in the entire development process; this pro-
cess became known as the ‘‘mainstreaming’’ of environ-
mental and natural resource management (Odwedo 1995).
Despite its favorable climate and soil conditions, Uganda
has a number of urgent environmental problems. According
to reports from organizations like the MNR (1994) and
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA
2007), these problems can be categorized into land, water,
forest, and biodiversity issues. The use of intensive agri-
cultural techniques threatens soil fertility and, particularly in
the hilly and mountainous areas of the country, causes soil
erosion. Wetlands are part of an important ecosystem that
purifies polluted water but their role is also deteriorating.
Because of the growing population and increasing demand
for land to use for agriculture and housing, these wetlands
are increasingly encroached on by illegal users; as a result,
they risk losing their important environmental functions.
Similar problems occur in forests where trees are illegally
cut to clear land for agricultural use and grazing. Trees are
also used for charcoal burning, which is a lucrative activity
since most households use charcoal for cooking. The pol-
lution of surface water is an acute environmental problem
because surface water is a primary source of drinking water
for a large part of the population. In addition, artisanal
fishing is a main source of livelihood for people living along
the shores of Lake Victoria and Lake Kyoga. Uganda is well
known for its birds and its wildlife, particularly the moun-
tain gorillas, so biodiversity must be protected for both
environmental and economic reasons; these natural resour-
ces are the basis for an important source of income from
tourism. Finally, NEMA points to the limited access to
reliable sanitary systems, which can lead to the rapid spread
of water-related diseases such as cholera and dysentery and
endanger the health of the urban and rural poor in particular.
This brief summary shows that many of the main envi-
ronmental problems in Uganda are simultaneously part of
other policy domains, such as agriculture (erosion and soil
fertility), forestry (encroachment and charcoal burning), and
health (water, solid waste, and sanitation). Addressing these
problems requires collaboration between environmental and
natural resource management and other policy domains. As a
result, the possibilities for carving out a specific domain for
local environmental policy are limited because problems
cannot be isolated as specifically environmental. The situa-
tion is even more complex because not all environmental
problems currently fall under the responsibility of the dis-
tricts. In Uganda, central control has been maintained by
placing conditions on the use of centrally derived resources
(Francis and James 2003). In particular, forestry and wildlife
conservation still have dedicated specialized institutions
under the control of central ministries. The management of
most forests is therefore the responsibility of the Ugandan
Forest Authority (UFA) and the protection of wildlife
reserves and national parks is the task of the Uganda Wildlife
Authority (UWA). Local governments only manage and
control forests under 100 ha, but even in these smaller forests
the UFA has a substantial influence because of its technical
knowledge (Bazaara 2003).
The decentralization of natural resource management in
Uganda effectively started in the late 1990s and took dif-
ferent forms. First, the central government delegated the
coordination, monitoring and supervision of all activities
related to the environment to a semi-autonomous executive
agency, NEMA. Second, the government privatized some
key aspects of environmental regulation. These mainly
concerned the execution of environmental impact assess-
ments and environmental impact studies, which were
undertaken by developers themselves or by private con-
sulting firms hired by these developers. Third, the central
government delegated to local governments and communi-
ties the duty to manage the environment in their respective
areas of jurisdiction. This last element appears to have been a
largely unilateral decision made by the central government.
Initially, the decentralization of environmental and natural
resource management occurred through the selection of a
limited number of focal districts. These districts received
extensive training and support from NEMA that allowed
them to experiment and show other districts how decentral-
ized environmental management could work in practice.
These first districts were later followed by others and all
districts are now expected to include the protection of the
environment in their development plans and to assign at least
one dedicated technical staff member to be the DEO.
Under the current system, central and local governments
do not always agree on who should play which role, why, and
how. The country seems to have a decentralized environ-
mental management configuration drawn by the central
authorities and handed over to the different districts (LC5)
for implementation and execution. Various responsibilities,
including environmental management, are devolved by the
center and imposed in a unilateral manner on the local
governments and communities, many of whom remain
reluctant to perform these tasks. The decentralization of
environmental policy in Uganda therefore cannot be con-
sidered equal to ‘‘participatory’’ environmental governance.
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This DEO is the key local officer in charge of a large
number of tasks in natural resource and environmental
management at the district level (see Table 1).
Generally, this one administrative officer alone is
responsible for fulfilling these tasks, although he or she is
expected to collaborate with other technical staff at the
district level and with the Local Environmental Committee.
The DEOs have several instruments at their disposal, but
their key policy tool is to link environmental objectives to
the overall district development plan; this plan determines
common policy goals for the district as well as bud-
get allocations (see Table 2 for an example).
The mainstreaming of environmental and natural
resource conservation must be achieved through these
district development plans; securing resources from the
district budget for environmental purposes requires inclu-
sion in these plans as well. In addition to their primary
tasks, DEOs may also engage in awareness-raising to
inform the general population about particular environ-
mental problems and to show what people can do them-
selves to solve (or prevent) them. Examples of such
activities include educational projects in which school
children make biodiversity inventories and develop plans
to protect local wetlands (Table 3) and joint efforts with
the local population to assess local waste management
practices. Finally, districts may develop legislative mea-
sures or bylaws that require their citizens to follow certain
guidelines for environmental protection; these guidelines
may prevent (or reduce) soil erosion or offer specific pre-
scriptions on charcoal production. Although such activities
could have a positive impact at the local environmental
level, as far they have been scattered and improvised.
This brief overview of environmental policy decentral-
ization in Uganda shows that very important steps have
been made in delegating certain tasks to the district
authorities and in creating the local capacity to implement
them. Over the years, an elaborate institutional framework
for decentralized environmental policy has been developed
but there are various institutional deficiencies in imple-
menting this framework in practice. For instance, in many
districts the District Environment Committees and Local
Environment Committees are nonexistent or do not func-
tion well. Even where the official structures exist and
function, they have problems effectively protecting the
local environment. As a result, the process and practice of
decentralized environmental policy in Uganda have
become topics of debate. The next section further analyzes
Table 1 The district environmental officers’ roles in natural resource
and environmental management in Uganda. (From Odwedo 1996.)
1. Set long-range development goals for the district and ensure the
integration of environmental action plans and concerns into the
planning process at the district and local levels.
2. Act as a forum for community members to discuss and
recommend environmental policies and bylaws.
3. Collect and disseminate data.
4. Coordinate activities of local environmental committees.
5. Mobilize the public to initiate and participate in environmental
and natural resource management activities through self-help.
6. Ensure that the local people, NGOs, the private sector, CBOs, etc.,
participate in environmental planning and the implementation of
environmental programs.
7. Develop district environmental action plans that incorporate
subcounty (LC3) environmental action plans.
8. Prepare a district state of the environment report once every
2 years.
Table 2 Environmental policy in the Mityana district. (Presentation
by the district natural resources officer of Mityana district at the
NEMA workshop in Entebbe, November 17, 2008.)
As in other parts of Uganda, in the Mityana district natural resources
provide the foundation for economic growth and the eradication of
poverty. However, land degradation is high, the district’s forest
cover is diminishing, and there is increased pollution of and
pressure placed on the wetland resources. To address these problems
and to strengthen the local environmental management capacity, the
district natural resources officer initiated the process of developing
an environmental and natural resource policy. A taskforce
composed of different district administrative staff was designated to
formulate the policy through a participatory process.
Key challenges during the process were the absence of reliable data
on the key issues identified for this policy and the effective
involvement of stakeholders. One key lesson was the importance of
formal engagement from other members of the staff in the taskforce.
This not only helped in the identification and exploration of the
issues, but also promoted the ownership of the output.
The Mityana district policy on environmental and natural resources
was passed by the district council in December 2008.
Table 3 A case of wetland management. (From Andeweg 2006,
p. 56)
The natural resources of the Oleicho wetland in Mukungoro
subcounty, Kumi District, are used by fishermen, rice cultivators,
cattle keepers, and domestic water users. The different interests of
these groups can cause conflicts. The local community and the
Kumi Sustainable Development Initiative met under the guidance of
the Wetland Inspection Division to develop a management plan.
This community-based wetland management plan for the years
2002–2004 focused on establishing equitable use and better
management of the wetland to improve the ecological and
hydrological functions of the wetland and to increase
socioeconomic well-being. To ensure a fair distribution and better
control of the available natural resources, the wetland is demarcated
for multipurpose and wise use.
A participatory method that involved users, the local council, and
religious leaders was used to plan and implement the project.
Wetland committees were established with at least one person from
every user group and chaired by the LC1 chairman. During the
process, the communities learned how to manage the wetlands
sustainably, and now, after the project has ended, the communities
still maintain and apply this acquired knowledge.
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current practices in decentralized environmental policy to
identify the main causes of these deficiencies.
Analyzing Current Practices in Decentralized
Environmental Policy
The decentralization of environmental and natural resource
management in a developing country such as Uganda
involves numerous complications that are familiar to many
sub-Saharan African governments. First, effective policy
development and implementation are hampered by the lack
of financial and human resources at the local level. In
addition, different policy goals compete heavily for
resources available in the district’s general budget, and the
environmental sector is relatively weak in this competition
(see Table 4). While some areas secure resources through
dedicated funding from the central government, this is not
the case for environmental protection.
In addition, environmental management is still a rela-
tively new field; few specialists are available and education
on this subject lags behind other subjects. This means that
qualified and motivated staff are hard to find, especially for
the more remote districts. This search is even further com-
plicated by the high turnover among DEOs. This problem
seriously hampers effective local environmental policy.
Below, we elaborate on some of the specific challenges that
complicate the decentralization of environmental policy in
Uganda.
First, these challenges include tensions that emerge
between the DEO and local politicians. Environmental
measures may, for instance, restrict access to natural
resources such as wetlands and forests and such restrictions
may not be very popular among the constituencies of elected
local politicians. Second, tension may arise between the
different levels of government, as some decisions that are
made on the national level, including those about financial
matters, are implemented locally without the local authori-
ties having had any input; this situation conflicts with the
general idea of decentralized decision-making. Finally, the
third challenge we want to discuss concerns the main-
streaming of environmental concerns into the broader local
development policy; such mainstreaming is essential to
success in a developing country where local authorities face
many urgent problems, including those related to the daily
survival of large numbers of poor people.
Tensions Within Local Governments
Tensions between administrative staff and politicians in the
district are the consequence of the different kinds of legiti-
macy they invoke for their choices and decisions. Nominated
technocratic and administrative personnel such as the Resi-
dent District Commissioner (RDC), the Chief Administra-
tive Officer (CAO), and the DEO generally base their
decisions on national laws and guidelines as well as on
professional information, whereas local politicians (notably
the District Chairperson [DCP]) are elected officials and
have legitimate claims to represent their constituencies
(Kabumba 2007). Unsurprisingly, elected (local) leaders are
often not very inclined to enforce environmental laws when
they are (expected to be) inconvenient to their voters; to do so
is to risk not being re-elected. These constituencies are, for
instance, not always supportive of the introduction and
implementation of local environmental protection measures
(Caulfield 2006) such as prohibitions on the use of wetlands
or forests. Bazaara (2003) found that councilors have diffi-
culty enacting environmental legislation or enforcing laws
that would create electoral difficulties or that are not in their
personal interests. In other cases, however, local councilors
may receive support from their electorate to make decisions
that are beneficial to the environment. See Table 5 for some
positive examples.
NEMA promotes a nonpoliticized approach to environ-
mental policymaking. The organization was established
with the explicit intention of creating a neutral, technically
oriented and nonpolitical institution. NEMA, and by
extension also the DEOs, are expected to have the quali-
fications and a reasonable degree of independence to be
able to avoid the constraints and difficulties of traditional
Table 4 Struggles over limited financial resources in the Mukono
district. (From Mubeezi 2007, p. 42)
After a district such as Mukono is informed about available funding
from the central government, the district prepares an annual district
plan before the start of the fiscal year. In the health sector, priority
areas are determined by reviewing reports and meetings with
subcounty and health unit committees. These meetings are supposed
to bring together all stakeholders and provide planners with
necessary information; however, leaders at the subcounty level
acknowledged that they were left out of this procedure.
According to the town health inspector of the Mukono Town Council,
environmental health service provision has been ignored in the
priority setting of the district. He pointed out that since
environmental health has always been a part of health in general,
less explicit attention has been paid to it, particularly when
compared to other health issues like the purchase of drugs. He
further pointed out that when the money allocated for a specific
activity is finished, this activity stops until another financial year
when a new request for funding is submitted. ‘‘If, for example, we
are constructing a borehole and the money needed exceeds that
which was budgeted for, then that’s where the work will end. We
would not have anywhere else to turn.’’ Thus, while leaders have the
authority to present the needs of the communities to the district
planners, their hands are tied. Money that comes to the district is
generally already set for specific activities; if it is designated for the
construction of a common latrine, that construction is done, even if
the community needs a borehole instead.
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bureaucracies (NEAP 1993). In reality, this focused
attention to environmental matters within the work of the
DEOs has to be effectuated via the deliberations of district
politics. This results in the emergence of several problems.
Politicians often find it difficult to manage the interrela-
tionship between policy formulation and policy imple-
mentation, which results repeatedly in their interference
with implementing measures that previously had been
agreed upon by the local council. Local politicians may
block the implementation of environmental measures for
the protection of specific private interests. One particular
complaint from the DEOs on this problem is that local
politicians are regularly not trained or informed enough to
understand the long-term environmental effects of their
decisions. The situation is further complicated by the
general lack of clarity on the difference in formal tasks
between the administrative staff and local politicians; as a
result, specific responsibilities remain debatable. Even
when legal provisions are present and clearly defined, a
power struggle may arise, particularly among the RDC,
DCP and CAO; environmental issues can be caught in the
middle. Whenever such a power struggle occurs, it also
becomes clear that the bureaucrats are a rather heteroge-
neous group, with varied backgrounds, interests, and loy-
alties; the local politicians tend to be much more
homogeneous (Kabumba 2007). If environmental problems
resulting from policy measures are part of this struggle,
they are not always supported equally by technical staff,
whose personal loyalties may lie with their particular
professional field rather than with their colleagues. The end
result may be that the DEO is the only staff member
defending environmental interests in a local political arena.
His or her position within this arena is rather weak because
it is not very attractive for local politicians to engage with
environmental topics; in addition, DEOs represent limited
funds and few (at least short-term) economic interests.
Finally, the formal position of the DEO in the district is
weak; he or she is generally a solitary civil servant in the
environmental field and not a full member of the district
technical planning committee, the central administrative
organ at the local level.
Tensions Between the Central and the Local Levels
The second tension concerns a universal problem in pro-
cesses of decentralization: Which tasks remain the
responsibility of the central government and which ones
become the responsibility of local authorities? The lan-
guage of Uganda’s environmental policy is participatory
and user-focused, but in reality the policy is mediated by
the legal and administrative structures and procedures
established for the implementation of nationally deter-
mined measures (Brinkerhoff and Kamugasha 1998). The
process is complicated because ‘‘authority and resources
are captured by either (or both) central or local actors who
have an interest in preventing them from reaching local
governments, and/or because the design of local institu-
tions and processes is frequently flawed’’ (Wunsch 2001, p.
286). In addition to a lack of clarity in dividing the formal
responsibilities, financial management may add to the
confusion. Decentralization in Africa has often failed,
despite promising discourses, because of the overcentrali-
zation of resources, limited transfers to subnational gov-
ernments, a weak local revenue base, lack of local planning
capacity, limited changes in legislation and regulations,
and the absence of meaningful local political process
(Robinson 2007). Uganda is confronted with similar
problems. In the case of wetland management, Andeweg
(2006) found that local governments are responsible for
planning and budgeting for wetland management activities,
but the funding for these activities is allocated by the
central government. In the case of environmental health, a
typical local-level service provision, funding must be
secured from the central government (Mubeezi 2007) (see
also Table 4). The lack of fiscal decentralization is there-
fore felt to constrain adequate environmental and natural
resource management at the local level. Over time, several
changes have been made to the ways in which local
authorities access the financial resources they require for
the implementation of their policies. On average, nearly
90% of the total expenditures of local authorities in Uganda
are funded by the central government, although the extent
of this reliance varies among different districts. In his
Table 5 Popular support
Mubeezi (2007) found that there is sufficient support from citizens or
community members to participate in decision-making and
activities related to the provision of environmental health services in
their areas. In the Mpigi District, most residents were willing to
provide labor or contribute financially toward the provision of these
services. This allows residents to have a sense of ownership and
thus encourages them to maintain the services. In addition,
according to the District Health Inspector, ‘‘Bringing environmental
services near the people has made them more responsive and
interested in government activities since they (are) able to follow up
the different projects taking place in their area. This was earlier very
difficult to do under centralized governance’’ (55). Likewise, in the
case of wetland management, Andeweg (2006) found that the
decentralization of wetland management in the Kumi and Mukono
districts has empowered the people and included local knowledge
and greater participation. This is said to have resulted in the
integration of environmental and wetland issues into district
planning and in a higher awareness among constituents about the
responsibilities they have in wetland use compared to the situation 5
to 10 years ago. According to a District Technical Planning
Committee member, ‘‘People have now picked an interest in
wetland management.’’ They became more aware and tend to use it
more sustainably. Without decentralization ‘‘[wetland degradation]
would have been much worse than it is now’’ (66).
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budget speech for fiscal year 2008–2009, the Minister of
Finance, Planning and Economic Development announced
a total allocation of 1.23 trillion Ugandan shillings (or 34%
of the national budget, excluding donor projects) as con-
ditional, unconditional, or equalization grants to the local
governments. In the same speech, the Minister also
announced new allocation formula for the distribution of
these resources since the ‘‘lack of a clear criterion…has
been noted by Parliament and other stakeholders as an area
of concern’’ (Daily Monitor, June 13, 2008). Through the
abolishment of the locally collected graduated tax in 2005
and increased use of conditional grants, the central gov-
ernment tries to influence and restrict ‘‘choice’’ and polit-
ical space for local authorities by attaching strong
conditions and supervision procedures to the use of grants.
A related, permanent tension is the lack of a mechanism
in Uganda to reconcile local authority (horizontal) and
sectoral agency (vertical) responsibilities and activities;
this lack undermines the coordination of resources that
should lead to better environmental management. In prac-
tice, sectoral programs are financed and monitored by
central ministry agencies and implemented independently
from local authorities; genuine central-local partnerships
that make use of the comparative advantages of local
governments could enhance the planning and implemen-
tation of these programs (Romeo 2003). Specialized
agencies such as the UWA and UFA constitute dedicated
and centralized structures and have local staff who must
work with the DEO and other local environmental insti-
tutions. However, they are national governmental staff and
their loyalty remains with the central government. More-
over, the DEOs and other local institutions have more
diverse interests than the specialized goals of wildlife
protection or forest conservation espoused by the UWA
and UFA, respectively.
For instance, the legal provisions for wildlife or forest
protection are not clearly detailed and the relevant legal
and policy frameworks are disjointed; this situation results
in many conflicts and the loss of forest- and wildlife-related
resources. Decentralization in the forestry sector has con-
tributed to greater inefficiency, as the transfer of powers is
mired in a confusing array of legal and policy changes. The
national government ultimately retained significant powers
over the management of forests and wildlife while selec-
tively ‘‘decentralizing’’ limited powers to district and
subcounty councils. Over time, power shifted both down-
ward and upward, with the Forest Department regaining
control of the coveted and larger central forest reserves in
1998. This unsteady progression of decentralization reform
points to an unwillingness to transfer significant, discre-
tionary powers over the management and use of forest
reserves and wildlife to the district and subcounty councils
(Muhereza 2003). A striking example of this reluctance is
the presidential interference in the protection of the Mabira
Forest reserve in 2006; 70 of the 300 km2 of protected
forest was to be allocated to a sugarcane plantation. Only
after national and international protest was the plan (tem-
porarily?) suspended (BBC 2007a, b).
Natural resources are officially managed for the benefit
of the people of Uganda. Local communities should be
central actors in the management of local resources and
they should also benefit from such resources. For example,
in the Bwindi Impenetrable National Forest the central
government, represented by the UWA, has devolved
decision-making to the local institutions. Cases or offenses
that are deemed to be ‘‘not critical’’ by the UWA (including
crop raids by wildlife, which many communities would
definitely define as a ‘‘grave’’ offense against them) can be
dealt with by local institutions or communities. However,
the Wildlife Statute and Policy already rules out the pos-
sibility of compensation cases on crop damage, thus lim-
iting the options available to address this problem. The
cases that the UWA defines as serious (the killing of
wildlife or cutting of big trees) can only be handled by the
UWA itself and the police. In other words, the decisions to
be made in ‘‘important’’ cases cannot be entrusted to local
communities and the UWA’s definition of the gravity of
the offense matters more than the communities’ own def-
initions (Namara and Nsabagasani 2003).
Mainstreaming Environmental Policy
A third tension in the decentralization process in Uganda
concerns the official objective of mainstreaming environ-
mental policy. Environmental and natural resource man-
agement is supposed to be connected with and possibly
integrated into other policy domains at the local level;
these domains include health, education, and economic and
infrastructure development. Achieving this goal requires
coherent policies and strategies as well as competition for
limited financial resources. In practice, however, main-
streaming environmental protection involves a number of
challenges. First, it is hard to convince technical and
administrative staff working on other policy issues of the
importance of environmental problems and the need to
address them collectively. Second, it is challenging to
identify priorities and adequate measures in a district
development policy in such a way that it does not make
environmental protection disappear behind other policy
goals. Overcoming these challenges is problematic as dis-
tricts generally have entrenched processes of planning and
conducting development activities. They tend to take a
strongly sectoral approach to planning and thereby exhibit
a bias toward social service (health and education) provi-
sions. This makes it difficult to effectively integrate
crosscutting issues such as the protection of environmental
292 Environmental Management (2010) 45:284–295
123
and natural resources (Brinkerhoff and Kamugasha 1998).
Some DEOs respond by underlining the economic impor-
tance of environmental and natural resource management
to increase interest among other administrative staff and
local politicians. They do this by stressing the relevance of
cost-benefit calculations and seeking ways to generate
monetary income from environmental protection activities,
such as payment for environmental services and earnings
from carbon credits. However, so far these attempts have
not yielded significant results, and it is difficult to translate
general principles into concrete material resources for
environmental policy.
In sum, the decentralization of environmental and natural
resource management in Uganda has been confronted with a
series of different structural problems over the last decade.
Tensions between civil servants and local politicians and
between central and decentralized levels of government and the
challenges of mainstreaming environmental protection have all
complicated the decentralization process. The question, then, is
whether decentralization should be abandoned altogether as an
achievable aim or whether some perspectives remain after
drawing lessons from these experiences.
Discussion and Conclusions
It has been nearly 20 years since decentralization reforms
began in Uganda and more than 10 years since environ-
mental and natural resource management was included in
these reforms. There remains a widespread consensus on
the desirability of this political transformation process
(Andeweg 2006). Decentralization in general has yielded
several positive results, including improvements in service
delivery as well as increased political participation and
more downward accountability by local politicians. Some
do suggest that the level of participation must be further
strengthened (Bazaara 2003). However, in the environ-
mental domain, the achievements—both in the extent of
local participation and accountability and in the social and
environmental outcomes—seem to be limited and to vary
across districts. Despite these limited results, one should
not fall into the trap of considering the decentralization
process itself to be responsible for these failures and
therefore suggesting that a centralized approach would
perform better (Bu¨scher and Dressler 2007). This limited
impact can be explained as the result of the insufficient
capacity (in terms of both knowledge and financial means)
of the DEOs. In addition, it is difficult to build working
local institutions that can provide complex and technically
demanding services under the conditions of scarcity and
general turbulence that prevail in Uganda. Variations in
environmental performance between different districts are
mostly explained by the permanent growth in the number
of districts, which creates disturbances by requiring repe-
ated reorganization.
However, without ignoring the reality of these problems,
they seem to insufficiently capture some of the more
structural dynamics involved. In Uganda, a great deal of
energy has been devoted to strengthening local capacity for
environmental and natural resource management through
training and focused support for elected officials and
administrative staff. However, local environmental man-
agement cannot be reduced to the individual qualities of
local actors. In many situations, environmental governance
outcomes depend less on the personal motivations and
qualities of the local councilors and administrators and
more on the incentives created by the institutional envi-
ronment in which they have to operate (Romeo 2003).
Instead of focusing on the individual level (as do many so-
called capacity building projects), two other levels should
be emphasized: the institutional level, where government
structures arrange local environmental management; and
the systemic level, where the policy and legal frameworks
direct local environmental policy.
Many districts saw a tension between nominated tech-
nical staff and elected local politicians. This problem will
not disappear by increasing the district environmental staff
capacity, although training may be beneficial if it is com-
bined with improved communication with politicians.
There is a structural tension in the decentralization process
between the goal of increasing efficiency and effectiveness
and the objective of increased local democracy, participa-
tion, and equity promotion (Robinson 2007). It is essential
to acknowledge that many environmental problems are not
simply technical and nonpolitical. As a result, environ-
mental policy involves difficult decision-making and the
need to balance competing interests. Because offsets
between different choices are necessary and result in
winners and losers among the local stakeholders, environ-
mental and natural resource management should be con-
sidered part of the political decision-making process. The
need to address the inevitable conflicts that result from
environmental measures should be incorporated into the
institutional framework in a more consistent manner.
Furthermore, it is essential to clarify the responsibilities
of national specialized natural protection agencies in
Uganda such as the UWA and UFA, particularly since they
have a parallel presence at the local level. These special-
ized institutions have many more material and human
resources than the districts and they directly control
important natural resources at the local level; however,
they lack local political support and feel no need to coor-
dinate with other interests. This situation understandably
leads to conflicts between different (groups of) local actors,
which should be solved by clearly dividing responsibilities
and requiring specialized agencies to integrate their
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activities into a coherent local environmental and natural
resource management policy.
Mainstreaming environmental and natural resource
management with other policy domains at the local level
requires the design of a local strategy for sustainable
development. Successful integration requires the recogni-
tion of environmental concerns as key elements in devel-
opment and not as luxuries that can be discarded whenever
economic or social concerns demand it. The importance of
environmental protection to the livelihood of local com-
munities, including the poor, should be emphasized and
made concrete. By promoting adequate policy measures,
environmental governance can be more successfully
mainstreamed into local development plans.
Finally, decentralization is a dynamic political process
that will probably never be finished; new subjects will
arise, scientific or technological innovations will change
optimal policy solutions, and political priorities may pro-
mote interventions through other levels of government.
Moreover, negotiations about the distribution of responsi-
bilities and the respective duties of various administrative
levels will continue. Decentralizing environmental policy
in Uganda is a process in which any successful set of
administrative reforms must be reconciled with the broader
political and economic context where economic growth is
necessary for financing administrative improvements
(Harrison 2001). In this process, particular attention should
be focused on securing the decentralization of significant
power, especially power over finances (Conyers 2007).
Foreign donors should be willing to engage in the same
approach, but currently international aid programs seem to
move away from project-based interventions (which allow
local government support) toward budget support; this
shifts decisions back to the center (Mitchinson 2003). If
donors seriously want to promote the decentralization of
environmental and natural resource management, they
should allow funds to be transferred to the district level
without imposing detailed conditions on their use; they
must allow local authorities to decide how best to use these
resources.
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